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Abstract
The aim of this Essay is to probe the causes of the European Union’s (”EU”) second-referendum
practice with a view to better understand what strikes many observers as a procedurally bizarre and
democratically dubious exercise. It is not the intention of this Essay to offer any justification for
the practice, but rather to explain the factors specific to the EU which have contributed to its
recurrence.
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INTRODUCTION 
The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 20091 after 
a long and tortuous path that began with the Laeken Declaration 
of 2001,2 authorizing the establishment of a Convention on the 
Future of Europe, followed by the eventual rejection of the 
resulting Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005.3 
When the Lisbon Treaty emerged two years later from the ashes 
of the failed Constitutional Treaty, the stakes were high and the 
investment of Member States and the European Union (“EU”) 
institutions in its success was substantial.4 A great deal of political 
time, energy, and capital had been invested in the process, and 
on this occasion, unlike the attempted ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty, Ireland was, for reasons peculiar to its own 
constitutional provisions,5 the only Member State to hold a 
popular referendum as part of the domestic ratification process. 
When the result of the referendum held in June 2008 was 
negative, Ireland came under significant pressure from the EU 
 
*  Professor, Harvard Law School. 
1. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 (entered into force Dec. 
1, 2009). 
2. Laeken European Council, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 
Presidency Counclusions, Annex 1, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 19 (2001). 
3. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 310/1 (never 
ratified). 
4. See Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349, 357 (2009). 
5. See generally Gavin Barrett, Building a Swiss Chalet in Irish Legal Landscape? 
Referendums on European Union Treaties in Ireland & the Impact of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 32 (2009) (explaining and critiquing the Irish 
constitutional provisions that caused Ireland to adopt a popular vote referendum). 
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and other Member States to find a way around the result, and to 
find a way of ratifying the treaty despite the popular no vote. 
The idea of being asked to vote again in order to “get the 
answer right” provoked media and public outrage.6 Yet, the 
Lisbon Treaty was not the first occasion on which an EU Member 
State was asked to hold a referendum for a second time. No less 
than three times in the history of the EU, a Member State whose 
population had voted against the ratification of a new EU treaty 
in a constitutionally binding referendum opted under pressure 
to rerun the referendum in the hope that the negative result 
would be reversed by the second vote. The first occasion involved 
the rejection by the Danes of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,7 
while the second involved the rejection by the Irish of the Nice 
Treaty in 2001.8 The only two such popular “no” votes against an 
amending treaty that did not result in the holding of a second 
referendum were the votes of the French and the Dutch 
electorates on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe in 2005. On that occasion, the impact 
and significance of the double-no was considered to signal the 
death of the Constitutional Treaty, and to render the prospect of 
a second referendum undesirable.9 
The fact that an EU treaty ratification referendum has been 
rerun under external pressure upon the Member State in 
question, not once but three times within fifteen years, suggests 
that it has become something of a European Union (“EU”) 
practice, and the curious and controversial nature of this practice 
calls for closer scrutiny. Critics have described it as undemocratic 
because it refuses to respect the will of the people as legitimately 
 
6. See, e.g., Sarah Collins, Demonstrators Claim EU is Trying to Railroad Irish Voters, 
IRISH TIMES (Dublin), Dec. 12, 2008, at 13; Mary Lou McDonald & Dick Roche, Head to 
Head: Is the Second Referendum on Lisbon an Abuse of Democracy?, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), 
Dec. 22, 2008, at 12; Elaine Edwards, Voters Being ‘Threatened’ on Lisbon, IRISH TIMES 
(Dublin), Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2009/0818/
breaking47.html. 
7. See Pernice, supra note 4, at 355. 
8. See id. at 356. 
9. See Gráinne de Búrca, The Lisbon Treaty No-Vote: An Irish Problem or a European 
Problem? (Univ. College Dublin Law Research Paper Series, Law Research Paper No. 3, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359042 (analyzing the difference between 
the reaction to the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty). 
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expressed in the result of the referendum,10 and a respected 
international democracy think-tank criticized the pressure that 
was placed on Ireland to hold a second referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty as “undermining the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU.”11 
The aim of this Essay is to probe the causes of the EU’s 
second-referendum practice with a view to better understanding 
the resort to what strikes many observers as a procedurally bizarre 
and democratically dubious exercise. It is not the intention of 
this Essay to offer any justification for the practice, but rather to 
explain the factors specific to the EU which have contributed to 
its recurrence. 
I. FACTORS UNDERLYING THE PRESSURE TO RESORT TO A 
SECOND REFERENDUM 
A. Strictures of the EU Treaty Amendment Procedure 
The most significant factor that explains the regular 
recourse to this curious practice is the rigorous procedure for 
amending the EU treaties, which has been laid down in the 
treaties themselves.12 Now contained in article 48(4) of the 
Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”),13 the basic requirement 
of the “ordinary revision procedure,” which is also the default 
requirement for treaty amendment in international law,14 is 
consent (“common accord” in the language of article 48 TEU) 
on the part of all the Member States and thus all of the Member 
 
10. See Anthony Coughlan, Same Referendum, Different Day—Why the Irish Should Vote 
‘No’ Again, EUROPEAN VOICE (Brussels), June 27, 2002, http://www.europeanvoice.com/
article/imported/viewpoint-same-referendum,-different-day-why-the-irish-should-vote-
no-again-/45125.aspx (discussing the potential unconstitutionality of a second 
referendum); see also Glen Ruffle, Third Time Lucky, INT’L REL., Oct.–Nov. 2009, 
http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/third-time-lucky (critiquing the second Lisbon Treaty 
referendum); Irish EU Vote Plan ‘Undemocratic’ , BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7777713.stm (stating views of the U.K. 
conservatives). 
11. Markus Schmidgen, Evaluation of the Irish Referendum on Lisbon Treaty, 
DEMOCRACY INT’L (Berlin), June 2008, at 14. 
12. See generally Bruno de Witte, Treaty Revision in the European Union: Constitutional 
Change through International Law, 35 NETH. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 51 (2004). 
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 48(4), 2008 O.J. C 
115/13, at 42 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. 
14. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 39, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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States who are party to the treaty being amended.15 A further 
onerous requirement of the EU treaty amendment procedure 
laid down in article 48(4) is that of ratification by every Member 
State in accordance with their domestic constitutional 
requirements.16 Indeed, even the new simplified revision 
procedure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty appears to envisage 
approval by every Member State.17 The requirement of 
unanimous consent on the part of all Member States for an EU 
treaty amendment to come into force obviously has the 
consequence that when one Member State fails to ratify or rejects 
the ratification of a proposed treaty, the rejection by that state 
jeopardizes the possibility of the treaty coming into force for any 
and all other Member States. Unlike the general rules of 
international law,18 EU law makes no allowance for the 
provisional application of an EU amending treaty pending its 
ratification by all Member States,19 or for the entry into force of 
an EU treaty amendment following ratification by a specified 
number, but not all of the Member States. Instead, the 
requirement of unanimous consent and the requirement of 
domestic ratification by all Member States for EU treaty 
amendment are unqualified.20 
The core of the critique of the second-referendum practice 
is that it fails to respect the outcome of legitimate constitutional 
processes and undermines the democratically expressed will of 
 
15. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 13, art. 48(4), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 42. 
16. See id. 
17. The language of article 48(6) does not explicitly specify “all of the Member 
States” as article 48(4) does of the ordinary revision procedure, but, on the other hand, 
it would be difficult to interpret “approved by the Member States” in article 48(6) as 
meaning only some of the Member States. Id. art. 48(4), 48(6), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 42. 
With that said, Member States are obviously free to decide for themselves what their 
constitution requires for approval of a decision of the European Council to amend the 
treaties by the simplified procedure. 
18. See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, arts. 24–25. The subject of provisional 
application is dealt with in article 25 and requirements concerning entry into force are 
contained in article 24. Id. 
19. Provisional application of a treaty containing new institutional rules to states 
which have ratified it but not to those which have not would cause significant difficulties 
in the EU context. See de Witte, supra note 12, at 71–72. 
20. The provision in article 48(5) of the Treaty on European Union was also 
present in the failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, and envisaged a 
procedure to be followed in the event of ratification by four-fifths of the Member States. 
See infra note 60; see also TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 13, art. 48(5), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 
42. 
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the people. However, it can also be viewed as a pragmatic 
response to an excessively strict EU treaty amendment process 
which may have been appropriate for a community of six 
Member States, but not for an EU of twenty-seven.21 It is perhaps 
unsurprising, given the strictures of the EU treaty amendment 
process, that pressure has been placed on Member States which 
have rejected ratification of a treaty to try to identify the reasons 
for the rejection and to address them, especially when most or all 
other Member States have already ratified, or plan to ratify, the 
treaty in question. 
B. Distinct Nature of the Context of EU Treaty Change Compared with 
Other International Contexts 
Pressure on a Member State to reconsider its failure to ratify 
a treaty is rarely found at the international level outside the EU. 
It is difficult to imagine significant external pressure being 
imposed on a state which is engaged in deciding whether or not 
to join the World Trade Organization, the Council of Europe, or 
any other regional or international organization. If the matter is 
put to a popular vote in a given state and the vote is negative, the 
matter is generally concluded. The state in question does not 
join, the organization does not gain a new member, a “no” vote 
in the referendum is taken to mean no and all parties move on. 
Further, even in the case of EU treaties governing accession, no 
prospective Member State whose population rejected the 
proposal to accede has yet been placed under external pressure 
to resubmit the referendum and to try again to have the treaty 
ratified. The population of Norway voted against EU 
membership,22 and that of Switzerland voted against European 
 
21. See Hervé Bribosia, Notre Europe, Réviser les traités européens: Plaidoyer en faveur 
de la suppression du veto [Revising the European Treaties: Advocating in Favor of Abolishing the 
Veto], at 1–35, Policy Paper No. 37, Dec. 1, 2009, available at http://www.notre-
europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Policypaper37-HBribosia-R_viser_les_trait_s.pdf 
(Fr.) (outlining a proposal to abandon the strict unanimity-based amendment process in 
favor of a lighter procedure). 
22. Two popular referenda were held on the question of whether to join the EU in 
1972 and 1994, respectively, and the proposal was rejected each time by a comfortable 
majority. See 1 CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NORWAY, FOLKEAVSTEMNINGEN OM EF 30 
[ADVISORY REFERENDUM ON NORWAY’S ACCESSION TO THE EC] (1972), 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/nos/nos_a522.pdf; The Norwegian Mission to the EU, 
Norway and the EU—Historical Overview, http://www.eu-norway.org/eu/History/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2010); 1994: Norway Votes ‘No’ to Europe, BBC NEWS, Nov. 28, 1994, 
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Economic Association membership,23 yet no external pressure 
was imposed on either state to rerun the referenda. Unlike the 
case of non-ratification of broader and more general EU 
amending treaties, no other Member State is particularly affected 
by a popular “no” vote on a proposed accession treaty, and the 
EU is not affected other than in its failure to gain a new member. 
The crucial difference in the case of referenda concerning 
EU amending treaties is that, unlike accession treaties and other 
similar agreements concerning EU association, cooperation, and 
neighborhood, amending treaties are not bilateral-type 
agreements between a new Member State and the EU. Once a 
state becomes a member of the EU, that Member State gains an 
effective veto over any treaty change affecting all Member States, 
even if all other Member States are in agreement and supportive 
of the change. Thus, the current EU treaty requirement of 
unanimous ratification of amending treaties24 means that any 
one Member State can block change desired by all other Member 
States. It is this feature that generates pressure on Member States 
whose populations have rejected a treaty that has otherwise been 
accepted by all or most others to reconsider the negative vote. 
C. Growing Mistrust of Popular Referenda on Constitutional Matters 
The other crucial factor which has been present in each of 
the five cases in which ratification of an EU amending treaty has 
been rejected by a Member State is that the ratification process 
which led to rejection involved a popular referendum rather 
than, for example, a parliamentary vote or an executive decision. 
Had the failure to ratify an EU treaty followed from a presidential 
refusal to sign, as could have been case in the Czech Republic or 
Poland; or from a constitutional court decision, as could have 
been the case in Germany; the Member State in question might 
not have experienced the same kind of pressure to find a 
solution to enable ratification. The EU’s willingness to encourage 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/28/newsid_4208000/
4208314.stm. 
23. See European Union, Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
switzerland/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); swissinfo, Switzerland and the 
EU, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/country_information/country_profile/
switzerland_and_the_eu.html?cid=5764106 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
24. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 13, arts. 48(4)–(5), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 42. 
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a Member State to try again, and to take action to reverse the 
rejection of a treaty, seems linked to the fact that the rejection 
was the result of a popular referendum. 
One interpretation of this, as critics have charged, is that the 
willingness to bypass the results of domestic referenda indicates 
elite disregard for the popular will.25 Less polemically, however, 
there seems to be a measure of political and intellectual 
skepticism about the suitability of popular referenda as 
instruments of constitutional reform.26 Such mistrust of the 
popular referendum as a decision-making mechanism for 
constitutional matters may have translated into an unwillingness 
to accept the outcome of a referendum process in a given 
Member State as decisive. The EU political response to a popular 
no-vote, on every occasion except that of the rejection of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in France and the 
Netherlands, has been to encourage the Member State in 
question to investigate whether the objections underlying the no-
vote were specific to that state, whether they could be 
accommodated or addressed within the terms of the new treaty 
in question, whether they were based on a misunderstanding of 
the treaty, or whether there was some other way in which the 
objections could be addressed without rejecting the entirety of 
the treaty and preventing its coming into force for the other 
Member States.27 
 
25. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 6, at 13 (noting the “railroading” of the Irish 
electorate by having a second vote on the Lisbon Treaty); Ruffle, supra note 10 
(criticizing the second referendum in Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty). 
26. See, e.g., Mark Franklin et al., Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European 
Unification in the Wake of Maastricht, 32 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 455, 458–71 (1994); 
Sara Binzer Hobolt, Direct Democracy and European Integration, 13 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 
153 (2006); Cameron Anderson & Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, Referenda Skepticism Among 
Highly-Informed Citizens: Assessing Three Explanations, (Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Political Science Association 2008), available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/
anderson-goodyear-grant.pdf. See generally LAWRENCE LEDUC, THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY: REFERENDUMS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 185–92 (2003) (evaluating the 
potential for direct democratic processes to improve democratic government). 
27. See de Búrca, supra note 9. 
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II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE VETO-
PRESSURE IN THE CONTEXT OF EU TREATY CHANGE 
A. Ex-Ante Flexibility Mechanisms 
The pressure imposed by the existence of the multiple veto 
points on EU treaty reform has, in the past, given rise to other 
distinctive mechanisms seeking to ensure adoption of a treaty by 
all Member States, while accommodating strong concerns or 
objections by particular Member States to certain parts of it.28 
Examples over the years of such flexibility mechanisms include 
the availability of extended transition periods, and, more 
recently, a variety of arrangements listed under the heading of 
“differentiated integration,” such as the opt-out for the U.K. 
social policy under the Maastricht Treaty protocol; the opt-outs 
for the Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from the 
Economic and Monetary Union; the opt-outs for Denmark, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom from the area of freedom, 
security, and justice; and more structured arrangements for 
closer cooperation29 or enhanced cooperation30 under the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, respectively. Such mechanisms 
have enabled a Member State that has particular concerns about 
an amendment due to be introduced in a new EU treaty to ratify 
the treaty despite its opposition by providing the state with an 
exemption from the policy or provisions in question. 
B. Unavailability of Unilateral Reservations 
In international law, one of the key mechanisms used to 
address the tension between the desire for widespread 
ratification of a treaty and controversy among potential 
signatories over its content is the possibility for states to enter a 
 
28. Several book-length treatments of different aspects of this subject exist. See, e.g., 
GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA & JOANNE SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM 
UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY (2000); BRUNO DE WITTE ET AL., THE MANY FACES OF 
DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAW (2002); FILIP TUYTSCHAEVER, DIFFERENTIATION IN 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1999). 
29. See generally Eric Philippart & Geoffrey Edwards, The Provisions on Closer 
Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam: The Politics of Flexibility in the European Union, 37 J. 
OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 87 (2002). 
30. See generally Thomas Jaeger, Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice and 
Flexibility in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 297 (2002). 
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unilateral reservation to parts of the treaty.31 Now governed in 
part by articles 19 through 23 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”),32 reservations can 
perform a similar function to that of ex-ante opt-outs in the EU 
context by allowing states to sign onto and ratify a treaty even 
while preventing the application to themselves of certain parts of 
the treaty that they find objectionable. 
The EU, however, with its closely integrated legal and 
political system, does not appear to allow for this traditional 
international law technique to be used by EU Member States in 
relation to EU treaties. Although there has been, to my 
knowledge, no academic or policy discussion of the possibility of 
Member States using reservations to treaties within the EU 
system, the very idea of unilateral reservations seems to conflict 
with the nature of the legal and political community founded by 
the EC treaties and with the assumption of collective 
participation in a strong common project. It could perhaps even 
be argued that the act of entering a unilateral reservation to an 
EU treaty on the part of an EU Member State would, given the 
nature of the European Union, be per se incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the EU Treaty, under the terms of article 
19(c) of the Vienna Convention.33 Nevertheless, the same 
tensions that give rise to the practice of reservations in 
international law exist also within the EU. The practice that has 
developed under EU law in response to these tensions, however, 
involves a process of reaching collective agreement on the 
making of a “declaration” or a supplementary legal “decision” to 
try to address the concerns of the dissenting state, instead of 
states unilaterally attaching reservations to an amending treaty. 
C. Ex-Post Mechanisms: Declarations and Decisions 
Where specific concerns are not identified or flagged by a 
state during the process of negotiating a treaty, they cannot be 
accommodated within the treaty itself through the mechanism of 
 
31. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) (concerning the 
permissibility of reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide). 
32. See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, arts. 19–23. 
33. Id. art. 19(c). 
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an ex-ante opt-out, but they may subsequently surface during the 
domestic debate on ratification. Equally, when the concerns felt 
by a particular state or its population do not relate to a specific 
EU policy or issue from which an opt-out could realistically be 
secured, but rather constitute a more general objection—for 
example, to the perceived democratic deficit of the EU—they 
cannot be addressed by means of a state-specific opt-out in the 
treaty itself. 
The response of the EU to situations of this kind—those in 
which particular concerns were not identified during the 
negotiation process and no opt-out was sought, or where the 
nature of the concerns are such that they cannot be addressed by 
a state-specific opt-out—has been to resort to intermediate 
political and legal solutions such as a declaration or a decision 
containing assurances. This was first seen in the response to the 
Danish popular no-vote to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.34 
After the Danish no-vote, which was the first time an EU 
amending treaty was rejected by an existing Member State 
following a popular ratification vote, the European Council 
(composed of the heads of state and government of the EU 
Member States) came up with a solution in the conclusions to its 
Edinburgh meeting in 1992. Generally referred to as the 
Edinburgh Agreement, it encompassed a decision and two 
declarations.35 In legal terms, part of this agreement was a 
decision of the heads of state and government of the EU Member 
States that, together with the declaration and the conclusions, 
contained various assurances and clarifications vis-à-vis Denmark 
on issues such as defense policy, Economic and Monetary Union 
(“EMU”), EU citizenship, justice, and home affairs.36 As a 
decision of the heads of state and government, this was an 
instrument that, despite its atypical nature within the EU legal 
 
34. See Helle Krunke, Peoples’ Vengeance: From Maastricht to Edinburgh: The Danish 
Solution, 1 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 339, 345 (2005). 
35. See Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Pt. B, 
Annexes 1–3, 25 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 14 (1992); see also EU-Oplysningen, Edinburgh 
Agreement, http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/emner_en/forbehold/edinburgh (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2010) (discussing the decision of the heads of state and government 
meeting within the European Council in Edinburgh in 1992). An official copy of the 
conclusions reached by the Council at Edinburgh is available on the European 
Parliament’s website at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/
default_en.htm. 
36. See EU-Oplysingen, supra note 35. 
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system, was binding as a matter of international law, although it is 
not entirely clear what effect a binding international law decision 
of this kind could have on the provisions of an EU treaty.37 No 
part of the decision or declaration actually sought to change 
existing law or to amend the EU treaties, but rather to offer 
interpretative reassurance that the various concerns of Danish 
voters in relation to citizenship, justice and home affairs, and 
defense policy were satisfied by the terms of the new treaty.38 The 
political effect, on the other hand, was clear: a sufficient number 
of Danish voters were evidently reassured by the assertions in the 
declaration and decision that the relevant aspects of Danish 
policy and sovereignty would remain unaffected,39 and the 
Maastricht Treaty was ratified following a second, successful 
referendum.40 
In the case of Ireland’s no-vote to the Nice Treaty in 2001, 
most of the arguments in favor of holding a second referendum 
hinged on the poorly conducted campaign and the very low 
turnout for the first referendum.41 As has since become the 
practice, an analysis of the no-vote was carried out with funding 
from the European Commission,42 and the various reasons for 
the rejection of the treaty were identified as precisely as possible, 
with a view toward enabling these issues to be addressed in the 
campaign preceding a second referendum. The only declarations 
made were by the Irish government and the European Council at 
the Seville European Council meeting in June 2002. These 
declarations concerned the EU Common Foreign and Security 
 
37. See Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena 
(Defrenne II), Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455, ¶ 58 (holding that the treaties could only 
be amended in accordance with the procedure set out in article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union); see also Gavin Barrett, Guarantees on Lisbon Do Change Nature of Vote, 
IRISH TIMES (Dublin), June 30, 2009, at 14. 
38. See Alexander Türk, The Lisbon Treaty After the Irish ‘No’ Vote: Ways Out of the 
Impasse, http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20090514125647_large.doc. 
39. See Nicolai Ronnebek Hinrichsen, The Constitutional Objection to European Union 
Membership: A Challenge for the Danish Supreme Court, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 571, 582–83 
(1997). 
40. See id. at 583. 
41. See Brigid Laffan & Adrian Langan, Notre Europe, Securing a “Yes”: From Nice I 
to Nice II at 3, 7, Policy Paper No. 13, Apr. 26, 2005, available at http://www.notre-
europe.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Policypaper13.pdf. 
42. See generally Richard Sinnott, Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate in the 
Referendum on the Treaty of Nice (Feb. 26, 2003) (unpublished report, Univ. College 
Dublin), available at http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/nice2.pdf. 
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Policy, and their main purpose was to reiterate the nature and 
status of Irish military neutrality and to provide reassurance given 
that this was not threatened in any way by the Nice Treaty.43 The 
second campaign in favor of the treaty was more actively 
conducted than the first, and the Nice Treaty was successfully 
ratified following a second referendum held in October 2002.44 
Matters were somewhat more complicated in the case of 
Ireland’s no-vote on the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. First, the Lisbon 
Treaty was considerably more ambitious, more complex, and 
more controversial than the Nice Treaty. Second, it was widely 
known to be a formally de-constitutionalized and reorganized, 
but substantially similar, version of the Constitutional Treaty, 
which had unexpectedly been rejected two years previously by 
referenda in France and the Netherlands.45 This meant that the 
option of resorting to a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
was politically more difficult than it had been in the case of the 
Nice Treaty in 2001, or, indeed, in the case of the Maastricht 
Treaty in Denmark in 1992, when the situation of a failed 
popular referendum on an EU amending treaty was confronted 
for the first time.46 The particular circumstances of the Lisbon 
Treaty, coming after the debacle of the Constitutional Treaty, 
and at a time when popular opposition to the EU had grown in 
Ireland, were much less easy to resolve by rapid resort to a 
second referendum. Nonetheless, after extensive discussion of 
the various options,47 particularly as to whether Ireland should 
 
43. See Seville European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Annexes 3–4, E.U. 
BULL., no. 6, at 20–21 (2002). 
44. See Peter Katz, The Treaty of Nice and European Union Enlargement: The Political, 
Economic, and Social Consequences of Ratifying the Treaty of Nice, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
225, 226 (2003). 
45. See Stephen C. Sieberson, Did Symbolism Sink the Constitution? Reflections on the 
European Union’s State-like Attributes, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2007) (stating 
that there would be substantive similarities between the proposed Lisbon Treaty and the 
EU Constitution); Dutch Say ‘Devastating No’ to EU Constitution, GUARDIAN (London), 
June 2, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics. 
46. See Nicolai Ronnebek Hinrichsen, The Constitutional Objection to European Union 
Membership: A Challenge for the Danish Supreme Court, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 571, 582 (1997); 
Ireland Rejects EU Expansion, BBC NEWS EUROPE, June 8, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/1376379.stm. 
47. See, e.g., HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS [IRISH NATIONAL  PARLIAMENT] SUB-
COMM. ON IRELAND’S FUTURE IN THE EUR. UNION, IRELAND’S FUTURE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: CHALLENGES, ISSUES AND OPTIONS (2008), available at http://euaffairs.ie/sub-
committee/sub-committeereport.pdf. 
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attempt parliamentary ratification of parts of the treaty, the 
inevitable route of a second referendum was chosen.48 This time 
however, given the heightened controversy over the Lisbon 
Treaty and the more active and engaged campaign which had 
taken place prior to the first referendum, Ireland sought a 
strengthened version of the usual declaration of reassurance. 
The conclusions of the European Council meeting of June 
2009 contain, in their annexes, two separate sets of measures 
addressing Ireland’s position, as well as a declaration by the Irish 
government setting out its own understanding of the legal effect 
of the Lisbon Treaty.49 The first of the two sets of measures is in 
somewhat similar form to that adopted in relation to Denmark at 
Edinburgh in 1992.50 It is a statement by the EU heads of state 
and government, which purports to “guarantee,” by means of a 
binding decision, that nothing in the Lisbon Treaty affects in any 
way the scope and applicability of the protection of the right to 
life, family, and education in the Irish Constitution; affects the 
EU’s existing competence in relation to taxation; or prejudices 
Ireland’s policy of military neutrality.51 The legal status of this 
part of the declaration is further bolstered by the decision that it 
is to be included in a future protocol to the EU treaties. Thus, it 
is currently binding as a matter of international law as a decision 
of the states, and it will, following its future enactment as a 
protocol to one of the EU treaties, be made binding as a matter 
of EU treaty law. Its content, however, is similar to the Edinburgh 
Declaration in that it does not purport to alter or amend 
anything contained in the Lisbon Treaty, but rather to provide 
legal guarantees and assurance that the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty, properly interpreted, do not contain anything that 
threatens these sensitive areas of Irish law and policy.52 The 
 
48. See Eric Pfanner & Sarah Lyall, Irish Vote for Treaty Centralizing Power in the 
European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at A6 (stating that Irish voters approved the 
Lisbon Treaty on October 3, 2009); see also Gavin Barrett, Is a Second Referendum 
Appropriate in order to Allow Ireland to Ratify the Treaty of Lisbon? (Univ. College Dublin 
School of Law, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263300 
(discussing the possibility of a second referendum and whether this would be feasible 
and appropriate to secure Irish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty). 
49. See Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annexes 1–3, E.U. 
BULL., no. 6, at 14–17 (2009). 
50. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
51. See E.U. BULL., supra note 49, at 15. 
52. See id. at 9. 
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second part of the declaration does not purport to be a legally 
binding decision, but merely a declaration that confirms the high 
importance attached by the EU to workers rights and social 
progress, and related matters, and recalls the relevant provisions 
of the EC and EU treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.53 
The third part of the European Council package is the 
declaration by Ireland itself, which, like the Irish Declaration on 
the Nice Treaty at Seville,54 asserts Ireland’s understanding that 
its policy of military neutrality will remain unaffected by the 
changes to be introduced in the Lisbon Treaty.55 
Declarations and decisions of this kind have now been used 
on several occasions by the EU, and although they have 
apparently contributed to a successful second referendum result 
each time, they remain an essentially ad hoc and legally 
uncertain response which does not address the fundamental 
concerns about the practice of holding a second referendum. In 
other words, while they seek to isolate and address the specific 
concerns of the population of the Member State which rejected 
the EU treaty and aim to overcome the claim that a second 
referendum is undemocratic, they remain unsatisfactory in 
several key respects. First, decisions and declarations cannot have 
the effect of amending the treaty whose ratification has been 
rejected, which means they are limited to providing either an 
interpretative declaration, or a purported legal guarantee whose 
effect amounts to little more than an interpretative declaration. 
It is far from clear whether or to what extent the Court of Justice 
in the future would read such a declaration as controlling or 
influencing the interpretation of a provision of the treaty itself. 
Second, it remains the case that the outcome of the procedure 
laid down for EU treaty amendment is not being respected, and 
that recourse to ad hoc mechanisms is regularly sought to 
sidestep the unwanted results of a legitimate process. 
CONCLUSION 
The repeated resort—three times in just over fifteen years—
to a second national referendum in the context of EU treaty 
 
53. See id. at 15–16 (Annex 2). 
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
55. See E.U. BULL., supra note 49, at 16–17 (Annex 3). 
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change, where the result of a first referendum has been the 
rejection of a proposed EU treaty, remains a controversial and 
troubling practice. The root cause of the imposition of such 
pressure on Member States in the position of Denmark and 
Ireland, whose populations have refused the proposed 
ratification of an EU treaty, is the distinctive and demanding EU 
mechanism for treaty amendment. The most obviously onerous 
dimension of this mechanism is the double-unanimity 
requirement of unanimous Member State consent and domestic 
ratification, but it is the combination of this requirement of 
unanimous consent and domestic ratification with a number of 
other distinctive features of the EU constitutional process that 
renders the problem particularly acute. The first of these is the 
fact that the constitutions or legal systems of several Member 
States provide that a popular referendum is necessary to ratify 
certain kinds of fundamental EU treaty change.56 The second is 
the fact that several of the flexible options which are available 
under international law are not permitted within the more tightly 
integrated EU legal system. More specifically, there is no 
possibility for the provisional application of an EU amending 
treaty following its ratification by a specified majority of Member 
States,57 and the international law regime of unilateral state 
reservations to treaties has not been applied within the EU 
context.58 Ultimately, this means that a Member State’s objection 
to certain parts of a new EU treaty cannot be accommodated 
other than by means of an ex-ante negotiated opt-out, or by the 
convoluted and legally unsatisfactory means of an interpretative 
declaration or decision of the heads of state and governments. 
Are there possible solutions to this apparent dilemma, or is 
the EU likely to continue the use of this dubious practice again in 
the future? It is certainly the case that, following the failed 
constitutional treaty and the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, 
there is no political appetite for further EU treaty reform for 
 
56. See, e.g., Simon Hug & Pascale Sciarini, Referendums on European Integration: Do 
Institutions Matter in the Voter’s Decision?, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 3, 13–21 (2000); Patricia 
Roberts-Thompson, EU Treaty Referendums and the European Union, 23 J. OF EUR. 
INTEGRATION 105, 113–16 (2001).  
57. See de Witte, supra note 12, at 71–82. 
58. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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quite some time.59 On the other hand, when the time for another 
EU treaty change does arise, even if it concerns only a treaty 
governing accession of a new Member State, the risks of the 
multiple veto points are likely to arise and move to center stage 
again. A first and perhaps most obvious solution would be to 
amend the procedure for EU treaty revision and, in particular, to 
abandon the requirement for unanimous Member State consent. 
This is a highly politically controversial issue, but one which has 
nonetheless recently been mooted as a consequence of the 
repeated experience of no-votes in popular referenda. First, the 
EU treaty, as amended following the Lisbon Treaty, contains a 
somewhat open-ended provision—similar to that which was 
contained in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe—
in article 48(5), which stipulates that “if, two years after the 
signature of a treaty amending the Treaties, four fifths of the 
Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States 
have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the 
matter shall be referred to the European Council.”60 While this 
does not amount to a relaxation of the requirement of 
unanimous consent, it at least opens up the possibility of a 
scenario in which a majority of the Member States can seek a 
political way of moving ahead with the ratification of a treaty 
which has not been approved by all Member States. 
Second, the prospect of formally amending the process for 
EU treaty ratification and removing the unanimity requirement 
has recently been mooted and analyzed in legal and policy 
circles.61 But there is clearly no immediate political energy to 
 
59. In their communiqué in December 2007, following the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU heads of state and government declared that “[t]he Lisbon Treaty 
provides the Union with a stable and lasting institutional framework. We expect no 
change in the foreseeable future, so that the Union will be able to fully concentrate on 
addressing the concrete challenges ahead . . . .” Brussels European Council, Presidency 
Conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 10 (2007). 
60. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 13, art. 48(5), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 42. It is unclear, 
however, what legal consequences would flow from such a referral or whether a treaty 
amendment could come into force when only four-fifths of the Member States had 
ratified. 
61. See Bribosia, supra note 21, at 7–14; see also EUR. UNIV. INSTIT., ROBERT 
SCHUMAN CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, REFORMING THE TREATIES’ AMENDMENT 
PROCEDURES: SECOND REPORT ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
TREATIES 11–14 (2000), available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Institutions/
2ndrapport_UK.pdf (describing the earlier proposal for improving amendment 
procedures). 
  
1488 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1472 
undertake such a major and controversial reform, and it is 
difficult to imagine EU Member States agreeing to it. The second 
option would be for all of the Member States to abandon the 
requirement of a popular referendum for the ratification of EU 
treaties, regardless of the possible impact of any such treaty on 
the national constitutional systems. This, however, is not 
something that can be stipulated as a matter of EU law, and it is 
for each Member State to decide for itself what its domestic 
ratification process for EU treaties should be, which makes it a 
difficult target for Europe-wide reform. Furthermore, the various 
domestic referenda concerning ratification of EU Treaties have 
provided some of the few occasions for real public engagement 
and debate on EU matters, countering the normal voter apathy 
and disinterest in EU affairs that has been such an intractable 
part of the democratic deficit.62 One innovative proposal for 
reform, which was put forward by a group of members of the 
Convention charged with drafting a constitutional treaty for the 
EU in 2004, was to substitute the system of individual national 
ratification procedures with a European-wide popular 
referendum.63 Unfortunately, this proposal—which would have 
retained the valuable element of democratic and popular 
legitimacy provided by domestic referenda, but simultaneously 
avoided some of the pitfalls of second-order voting that takes 
place during domestic referenda on EU issues64—was not acted 
upon by the Convention presidency, which meant that this 
interesting and promising reform proposal fell by the wayside.65 
The requirement of double-unanimity—unanimous state 
consent and unanimous national ratification—before an EU 
 
62. See Nick Clark & John Hulsey, The Salience of EU Issues: Explaining Political 
Behavior in European Parliament Elections, 10th Biennial Meeting of the European Union 
Studies Association, at 2 (2007), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7786/01/clark-n-
02h.pdf (noting that average EU voter turnout has been declining but that the Irish and 
Dutch referendums produced a much higher turnout than normal); see also Thomas 
Risse & Mareike Kleine, Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods, 45 J. OF 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 69, 70–79 (2007). 
63. See Referendum on the European Constitution: Adoption, Ratification and Entry into 
Force Procedure, Secretariat, European Convention, Contribution Submitted by Several 
Members, Alternate Members and Observers, Annex, No. CONV 658/03 (Mar. 31, 
2003), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/
cv00658.en03.pdf. 
64. See John Garry et al., ‘Second-order’ Versus ‘Issue-voting’ Effects in EU Referendums, 6 
EUR. UNION POL. 201, 203–05, 215–16 (2005). 
65. See de Witte, supra note 12, at 76–80. 
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treaty can come into force has been a central part of the 
consensus-building as well as the trust- and community-building 
that has been an essential aspect of the development of the EU’s 
uniquely densely integrated political and legal system. Yet it 
seems clear that the decision to consider and confront the 
possibility of relaxing the absolute nature of the double-
unanimity requirement is one which can only be postponed, but 
cannot ultimately be avoided, given how unsatisfactory and 
unsustainable the second-referendum practice has been to date. 
